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Abstract 
In this paper I examine the relationship between the strength of creditor rights, their enforcement, 
corporate governance and corporate dividend payout in a sample of 281 emerging market firms. I show 
that the outcome model of dividends, which states that  corporate dividend payout increases in the strength 
of corporate governance, holds in emerging markets, but only where the legal enforcement of creditor 
rights is strong. Where legal enforcement is weak, the shareholders of better-governed firms are not able 
to use their legal rights to extract large dividends from firms. The shareholders of better-governed firms 
are unable to extract large dividends from firms irrespective of the strength of creditor rights. That is, 
differences in creditor rights are not systematically related to dividend payout in the way predicted by the 
agency costs of debt and equity version of the outcome model of dividends.    
Key words: Corporate governance; Creditor rights; Legal enforcement; Agency models of dividends; 
Dividend payout; Emerging markets.   
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1. Introduction 
In their 2000 publication, La Porta et al. (2000) present two agency costs of equity models of 
dividends, namely the outcome and substitution models. The outcome model suggests that dividends are an 
outcome of effective governance, where governance can be either country and/or corporate governance 
(see Mitton, 2004; and Bartram et al., 2012). Given the agency costs associated with free cash flow, 
shareholders prefer dividends to retained earnings since dividends reduce the pool of funds which can be 
consumed privately by controlling insiders (see Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984). In turn, the outcome 
model suggests that it is the shareholders with the greatest legal rights (and/or belonging to better-
governed firms) whom can extract the largest dividends from firms. Hence, the theoretical prediction of 
the outcome model is that, all else equal, dividend payout increases in the strength of shareholder rights. 
On the contrary, the substitution model predicts that corporate dividend payout decreases in the 
strength of shareholder rights. In emerging markets where firm-level bonding mechanisms are few, the 
substitution model suggests that financially-constrained poorly-governed firms pay large dividends in the 
hope that these reputationally-enhancing dividends reduce their cost of external finance (see Benos and 
Weisbach, 2004).1 In contrast, well-governed firms, presumably less financially-constrained, pay much 
lower dividends. In the period since the publication of La Porta et al. (2000), the extant literature has 
found empirical support in favour of both models. For example, Mitton (2004), Chae et al. (2009), 
Jiraporn et al. (2011), Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010), Bartram et al. (2012), Brockman and Unlu (2009, 
2011), Byrne and O’Connor (2012), Shao et al. (2009), and Sawicki (2009) in post-Asian crisis Asia, all 
support the view that dividend payouts increase in shareholder rights. On the other hand, John and 
Knyazeva (2006), Officer (2007), Jo and Pan (2009), Jiraporn and Ning (2006), Chae et al. (2009), and 
Sawicki (2009) (in pre-Asian crisis Asia), uncover evidence which supports the substitution model i.e. 
dividend payouts decrease in shareholder rights.    
Brockman and Unlu (2009) extend the agency costs of equity version of the outcome and 
substitution models by incorporating the agency costs of debt. The result is that the theoretical predictions 
of the agency costs of equity and debt version of the outcome model of dividends are different. Now, given 
the agency costs of debt, the outcome model predicts that dividend payout increases in the strength of 
                                                 
1 Other bonding mechanisms in emerging markets include international cross-listings (Coffee, 1999; Doidge et al., 
2004, 2009; Ferris et al., 2009) and strategic alliances (see Siegel, 2009).   
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shareholder and creditor rights. However, where creditor rights are weak, and even where shareholder 
rights are strong, creditors demand and firms consent to lower dividends. In effect, creditors substitute 
poor legal rights for lower dividends. Using country-level measures of shareholder rights, both Shao et al. 
(2009) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012) find support in favour of this prediction; the outcome model of 
dividends holds where shareholder and creditor rights are strong.   
In this paper, I test the theoretical predictions of the agency costs of debt inclusive version of the 
outcome model of dividends. My paper differs to others in a number of crucial respects. First, I do so using 
firm-level measures of shareholder rights i.e. corporate governance, in contrast to the country-level 
measures employed by Shao et al. (2009) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012). Since we already know that 
dividend payout is an outcome of strong corporate governance in emerging markets (Mitton, 2004), I 
examine whether this relationship is altered given cross-country differences in the strength of creditor 
rights. To ensure that my work is consistent with that of Mitton (2004), I use the same Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA, 2001) corporate governance scores that he uses. Second, I account for cross-
country differences in the extent to which the legal rights of creditor rights are enforced. This is 
important since, in some countries, creditor rights as written in statute appear strong, but are poorly 
enforced.2 Hence, in these countries, given the poor enforceability of contracts, creditors may demand 
lower and not larger dividends, as the ‘strong’ creditor rights measure would otherwise suggest. In fact, 
recent evidence from the loan-contracting literature supports the view that it is the enforcement of 
creditor rights, and not creditor rights per se which matters the most ((see Bae and Goyal, 2009; and 
Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002, 2005). Hence, I hypothesize and proceed to formally test that in emerging 
markets, dividend payout is an outcome of strong corporate governance and strong enforcement of creditor 
rights.3     
 To perform these tests, I collect a sample of 281 firms from 21 emerging market countries. Like 
Mitton (2004), I test the agency models of dividends using shareholder rights measured at the corporate 
level (i.e. corporate governance) by employing the corporate governance scores complied by Credit 
                                                 
2 For example, in Hungary creditor rights are weak but their enforcement much stronger.   
3 Byrne and O’Connor (2012) do explore the relationship between corporate governance, the strength of creditor 
rights and corporate dividend payout, but find no evidence to support the prediction that dividend payout is an 
outcome of strong corporate governance and creditor rights. The considerable variation in the enforcement of 
creditor rights in strong creditor rights regimes, which they fail to account for may explain their findings.      
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Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2001). I begin by reconfirming the findings of Mitton (2004), that is, the 
agency cost of equity version of the outcome model of dividends prevails in emerging markets. The 
shareholders of better-governed firms extract the largest dividends from firms. To see if they can still do 
so given the strength of creditor rights, I test the agency costs of debt inclusive version of the outcome 
model by estimating regressions by the strength of creditor rights and the strength of the legal 
enforcement of these rights. The results from these tests suggest that creditors do exert a significant 
influence on corporate dividend policy, over and above the influence exerted by shareholders. As a result, 
shareholders can only use their legal rights to extract dividends from firms where the legal enforcement of 
creditor rights is strong. Like Byrne and O’Connor (2012), I show that differences in creditor rights are 
not systematically related to dividend payout in the way predicted by the agency costs of debt and equity 
version of the outcome model of dividends i.e., the outcome model of dividends does not hold given strong 
creditor rights. These findings suggest that it is the enforcement of (creditor) legal rights, and not creditor 
rights per se, which permit the outcome model to prevail in emerging markets. These findings are in line 
with the loan-contracting literature which also demonstrates that it is the enforcement of creditor rights 
which matters the most (see Bae and Goyal, 2009; and Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002, 2005).4         
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present a brief review of the literature and 
develop a number of testable hypotheses. In section 3, I describe the data. In section 4, I outline the test 
procedure, and then present and discuss the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.                                
 
2. Literature Review & Hypotheses Development 
In this paper I empirically test two agency costs of equity models of dividends, namely the outcome 
and substitution models of La Porta et al. (2000) inclusive of the agency costs of debt by incorporating the 
strength, and enforcement of creditor rights. The agency cost of equity version of the outcome model 
which is theoretically grounded in Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, states that dividends can 
reduce the agency costs associated with free cash flow. Since expropriation of free cash flow by self-
serving insiders is value-decreasing for minority shareholders, shareholders prefer dividends to retained 
                                                 
4 This is not necessarily the consensus view. Qian and Strahan (2007) suggest that creditor rights matter more than 
their legal enforcement.    
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earnings. In turn, efficient corporate governance makes it possible for shareholders to extract dividends 
from firms. As a result, the prediction of the outcome model is that dividend payouts are largest when free 
cash flow exists and where shareholder rights are strong i.e. dividends are an outcome of strong corporate 
governance. In the intervening period since the publication of the La Porta et al. (2000) paper, numerous 
studies have found support in favour of the outcome model using shareholder rights proxies measured at 
the country and/or corporate level (see for example, Mitton, 2004; Chae et al, 2009; Jiraporn et al, 2011; 
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; and Sawicki, 2009, for Asian firms in post-Asian crisis Asia).   
On the other hand, the substitution model predicts a negative relationship between governance 
(country and/or corporate) and corporate dividend payout. In effect, dividends in their agency role 
substitute for poor corporate governance. Furthermore, the willingness on the part of firms, or more 
precisely the managers of those firms to pay large dividends given poor governance, is a function of the 
firms’ external financing need. The substitution model predicts that poorly-governed firms wishing to 
enhance their reputation (presumably to raise external capital at lower cost) pay dividends. Since the cost 
of (equity) capital decreases in corporate governance (Chen et al., 2009), the substitution model predicts 
that firms substitute poor governance for (higher) dividend in the hope that reputationally-enhancing 
higher dividends reduces their cost of capital. In contrast, firms already with a sound reputation for fair 
treatment of their minority shareholders, that is well-governed firms, will pay fewer dividends. 
Consequently, the substitution model predicts that all else equal, dividend payouts decrease in shareholder 
rights.5 There also exists plenty of empirical support for the substitution model (see for example, John and 
Knyazeva, 2006; Officer, 2007; Jo and Pan, 2009; Jiraporn and Ning, 2006; Chae et al, 2009; Sawicki, 
2009, in pre-Asian crisis Asia), Mitton (2004) in civil law countries only, all find support in favour of the 
                                                 
5 Of course an alternative to paying large dividends would be to improve corporate governance, which in turn would 
reduce the firms cost of capital. However, in some countries, most notably those with poorly developed financial 
markets, the net benefit (i.e. benefits less costs) of governance improvements even for firms with an external 
financing need is negative (Doidge et al, 2007). Hence, for these firms, increased dividends may represent a much 
less costly bonding mechanism when compared to the costs of improving their corporate governance practices. The 
short-term costs of paying large dividends for poorly governed firms are the costs associated with forgone positive 
NPV projects and costly external finance (which presumably will decrease once reputation has been established). 
Alternatively, these same firms could improve their governance by cross-listing as an exchange-traded ADR in the 
U.S. The costs are large and tend to result in enhanced governance through reputational as opposed to legal 
bonding. Interestingly, when firms cross-list as Level 2/3 ADRs, they pay less dividends (O’Connor, 2006; and 
Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010), which suggests that enhanced governance substitutes for dividends for these firms.   
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substitution model of dividends).6 Brockman and Unlu (2011) show that the substitution model prevails in 
countries where disclosure environments are opaque and the outcome model in countries where disclosure 
environments are transparent.  
Brockman and Unlu (2009) extend the agency cost of equity version of the agency models of 
dividends, originally proposed by La Porta et al. (2000). They outline and test an agency cost of debt and 
equity version of the original agency models of dividends. In doing so, they present an alternative 
substitution model. This model suggests creditors substitute poor legal rights for lower dividends, which has 
important consequences for the ‘original’ outcome model of dividends. If shareholder and creditor rights 
are strong, then the predictions of the agency cost of debt inclusive outcome model of dividends is 
amended, and now predicts that dividend payouts are greatest, where shareholder and creditor rights are 
strong, all else equal. Where shareholder rights are strong, but creditor rights weak, dividend payouts are 
expected to be much lower. Hence, lower dividends substitute for poor creditor rights, and the outcome 
model is less effective under weak creditor rights.    
Shao et al. (2009) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012) find support in favour of this prediction. Both 
show that the outcome model of dividends prevails where shareholders and creditors enjoy substantial legal 
rights.7 In both studies, shareholder rights are measured at the country-level. In this paper, I test the 
predictions of the agency costs of debt and equity version of the outcome model of dividends using firm-
level shareholder rights measures. My first hypothesis simply states that: 
Hypothesis 1: The outcome model of dividends is more effective under strong creditor rights.      
Next, I utilize cross-section differences in the legal enforcement of creditor rights across 
countries, and hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: The outcome model of dividends is more effective under strong enforcement of 
creditor rights.    
                                                 
6 The results of these tests using U.S. firms are mixed. Using the anti-takeover governance index of Gompers et al. 
(2003) to measure the strength of corporate governance of U.S. firms, John and Knyazeva (2006), Officer (2007), Jo 
and Pan (2009), and Jiraporn and Ning (2006) find in favour of the substitution model. Again using U.S. firms, but 
now using governance data from the Institutional Shareholder Services, Jiraporn et al. (2011) find evidence in favour 
of the outcome model. The ISS data is a much broader corporate governance measure than the G-Index, which in 
turn, likely explains the conflicting findings. 
7 Interestingly and at least till now, without explanation, Shao et al. (2009) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012) 
demonstrate where creditor rights are weak, the original agency costs of equity version of the substitution model 
prevails i.e. dividend payout decreases in the strength of shareholder rights. Thus, the outcome model is ineffective 
given weak creditor rights.    
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Finally, I examine whether the outcome model is more effective under strong creditor rights or the 
strong enforcement of these creditor rights. Recent evidence from a related literature (i.e. the loan-
contracting literature) supports the view that it is the enforcement of creditor rights, and not creditor 
rights per se which matter the most ((see Bae and Goyal, 2009; and Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002, 2005). 
For example, Bae and Goyal (2009) show that loans amounts and maturities are much lower given poor 
enforceability of creditor rights. In contrast, creditor rights do not influence loan amounts or maturities. 
In this paper, I examine whether it is creditor rights, or the enforcement of these creditor rights which are 
more important for the effectiveness of the outcome model of dividends. Hence, the final hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 3: The outcome model of dividends is more effective under strong enforcement of 
creditor rights than under strong creditor rights.   
           
3. Data 
In this paper I examine the relationship between the strength of creditor rights, their legal 
enforcement, and the outcome model of dividends. The equity-only version of the outcome model of 
dividends contends that dividend payouts increase in the strength of shareholder rights, where 
shareholder rights can be measured either at the country and/or firm-level (i.e. corporate governance). In 
this paper, I focus on shareholder rights measured at the firm-level. To measure the strength of corporate 
governance, I follow Mitton (2004), and others, and use the corporate governance scores developed by 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2001).8 The CLSA governance ratings range from 0 to 100 with 
higher values suggesting higher quality corporate governance practices. The rating for each individual 
firm, for which there is 495 firms in total across 25 emerging market countries, is a aggregate measure of 
57 qualitative, binary (Yes/No) questions which span seven distinct governance categories, namely 
management discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social 
awareness. The first six governance provisions have a 15% weighting in the composite index, while social 
awareness has a 10% weighting. 9 The rating for each firm is constructed by CLSA analysts. In this paper, 
                                                 
8 For example, Klapper and Love (2004) explore the relationship between governance and firm performance, 
Durnev and Kim (2005) governance and firm value, and more recently Chen et al. (2009) governance and firm value 
via the cost of equity capital, all using CLSA governance data.   
9 The CLSA (2001) governance measures are far from perfect. Two of the major criticisms of the scores are, first, 
they suffer from subjectivity bias since some of the answers to the questions are not “matter-of-fact”, but instead 
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I use only the first six governance provisions to construct the composite governance measure since 
dividend payout is unlikely to be related to social awareness. Consequently, the composite corporate 
governance score that I use in this paper is an equally weighed average of the first six corporate 
governance provisions.10 A sample of some of the questions in each governance category is listed below. 
1. Discipline. Has the company issued a “mission statement” that explicitly places a priority on 
good corporate governance? Does the company’s annual report include a section devoted to the 
company’s performance in implementing corporate governance principles?   
2. Transparency. Are accounts presented according to IGAAP? Does the company consistently 
disclose major and market sensitive information punctually?  
3. Independence. Is the chairman an independent, nonexecutive director? Does the company have 
an audit committee? Is it (the audit committee) chaired by a perceived genuine independent 
director?   
4. Accountability. Are the board members and members of the executive/management committee 
substantially different? Do independent, nonexecutive directors account for more than 50% of 
the board?   
5. Responsibility. Are there mechanisms to allow punishment of the executive/management 
committee in the event of mismanagement? Is the board small enough to be efficient and 
effective? (If more than 12 answer “No”).    
6. Fairness. Do all equity holders have the right to call General Meetings? Are voting methods 
easily accessible?  
              
I use three different dividend payout measures, namely dividends-to-earnings (%), measured as 
dividends per share divided by earnings per share, dividends-to-cashflow (%), measured as dividends per 
share divided by cashflow per share, and dividends-to-sales (%), measured as cash dividends (paid to 
common and preferred shareholders) divided by net sales.11 All data is sourced from Worldscope at the 
end of year 2001, which is the same year in which the governance data was compiled by the CLSA 
analysts.   
                                                                                                                                                        
completed based on the experiences of the analyst who covers each firm. Durnev and Kim (2007) do show that the 
bias is likely to be low since they find that firms reported for corporate misdemeanors do score low in the CLSA 
(2001) governance measure. Second, there is some overlap in the different categories. For example, the question 
“Are the board members and members of the executive/management committee substantially different?” is placed 
in the accountability section but could easily, without controversy be placed under the independence heading.        
10 My results are qualitatively unchanged when I use the corporate governance variable inclusive of social awareness. 
The results are available from me upon request.     
11 Others focus on testing the outcome and substitute models of dividends using total corporate payout i.e. 
dividends and share repurchases (Chae et al., 2009; Bartram et al., 2012). I cannot do likewise since I don’t have 
access to share repurchase data.   
 [9] 
 
 In all regressions, I control for firm size, firm profitability, firm growth, and corporate cash 
holdings.12 Size is measured as the log of book assets in US$, growth is the logarithmic one-year asset 
growth, profitability is earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to book assets, and cash holdings is 
cash scaled by book assets. Size and profitability are expected to positively influence dividend policy. In 
contrast, high growth firms typically pay smaller dividends. Finally, the expected relationship between 
cash holdings and dividend payout is ambiguous. On the one hand, firms with high cash reserves but with 
little or no demand for external finance are likely to pay a dividend. On the other hand, firms with 
anticipated future growth opportunities may finance this growth with their cash reserves, and refrain from 
paying a dividend. 13 All firm level variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.             
I include three country level determinants of dividend policy, namely shareholder and creditor 
rights, and the strength of enforcement of these rights. I use the revised version of the anti-director rights 
measure from Spamann (2010) to account for the strength of shareholder rights at the country-level. 
Since this data is missing for China, Hungary, and Poland, I use the Djankov et al. (2008) measure of 
shareholder rights, also a revised anti-director rights measure, for these countries. The creditor rights 
measure is taken from Djankov et al. (2007), and ranges from a low of zero to a high of four, where 
higher values represent stronger creditor rights. A priori, the sign on the shareholder and creditor rights 
variables are expected to be positive (see La Porta et al, 2000; Brockman and Unlu, 2009; Byrne and 
O’Connor, 2012). The legal enforcement variable is also taken from Djankov et al. (2007). It is a measure 
of “the number of calendar days to enforce a contract of unpaid debt worth 50% of the country’s GDP 
per capita”, where low values imply strong contract enforcement.    
The final sample, comprised of 281 firms from 21 countries, is presented in Table 1. The twenty-
one countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Korea (Republic), Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, 
                                                 
12 In unreported results, I show that my findings are qualitatively unaffected by the inclusion of two other control 
variables, namely retained equity to total assets and total equity and total assets (DeAngelo et al., 2006). The primary 
drawback of including these additional control variables is that they reduce the final sample of firms to 220. Hence, I 
exclude them in order to maximize the sample size at 281 firms.     
13 The ambiguity surrounding the relationship between cash holdings and dividend payout is grounded in how one 
perceives the nature of the relationship between corporate cash holdings and firm-level financing constraints. 
Fazzari et al. (2000) and the proponents of the cash flow sensitivity of cash approach to estimating firm-level 
financing constraints (Almeida et al, 2004) suggest that financial-constrained firms hoard cash (and pay little or no 
dividends). In contrast, others (Cleary, 2005) suggest that the very existence of cash reserves suggests that firms are 
not financially-constrained, since these firms can finance internally rather than externally. These firms can, and 
presumably pay a dividend.     
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Thailand, and Turkey. The number of firms varies sizably by country. India (48 firms), followed by 
Taiwan (31) and Hong Kong (27) provide the greatest number of firms. Together these three countries 
contribute 106 or 37.7% of the entire sample of firms. In contrast, there is just a single firm from 
Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. Columns three and four of Table 1 present the median and standard 
deviation corporate governance score by country. The median firm is best governed in Peru (Corporate 
governance score is 76.48), followed closely by Mexico (66.99), Argentina (66.67), and Singapore (66.45). 
In contrast, corporations tend to be less well-governed in, amongst others, Pakistan (26.83), Indonesia 
(36.33) and Korea (39.73). Interestingly, the greatest variation in governance practices occurs in Pakistan, 
where the median firm, at least in this sample, is the least well-governed of all firms.14 The standard 
deviation of governance practices in Pakistan (16.71) suggests that not all firms in Pakistan are as poorly-
governed as their median counterpart. The variation in corporate governance practices is much lower in 
Mexico (3.97), Chile (4.18), and Korea (5.73). 15 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The median and standard deviation dividend payout for each payout measure are contained in 
columns six to ten. They suggest that the median firm in Colombia (dividends to earnings (cashflow) (%) 
is 66.00 (82.20)), Pakistan (dividends to earnings (cashflow) (%) are 64.90 (67.30)), and Hong Kong 
((dividends to earnings (cashflow) (%) are 43.10 (45.10)) pay large dividends. In contrast, dividend 
payouts are much lower in Korea (dividends to earnings (cashflow) (%) are 5.55 (2.35)), and the 
Philippines (dividends to earnings (cashflow) (%) is 5.30 (0.40)). The median firm from Turkey does not 
                                                 
14 A large literature exists which examines the firm and country-level factors which promote firms to practice better 
corporate governance (Klapper and Love, 2004; and Durnev and Kim, 2005). These ‘governance-predictions’ , as 
they are commonly referred to, find that large firms, firms with a need for external finance, and firms with large 
proportion of ‘soft/intangible’ assets practice good corporate governance. Also, corporate governance quality 
improves with ownership concentration, provided there is no deviation from one-share-one-vote (i.e., dual-class 
firms typically have poorer governance than single-class share firms). Cross-listing firms and firms domiciled where 
country governance (e.g., shareholder rights strong, efficient judiciary) is strong also tend to be better governed. 
However, Doidge et al. (2007) show that some firms with these ‘desirable’ characteristics may not necessarily 
practice better governance, since the costs of doing so can outweigh the perceived benefits. The costs of doing so 
are greater where financial development weak. Aggarwal et al. (2009) highlight the differences in governance 
practices between U.S. and non-U.S. firms, and show that amongst others, differences in financial development 
between the U.S. and non-U.S. countries can explain part of the superior governance practices of U.S. firms. 
Furthermore, recent work suggests that some firms do not adopt ‘desirable’ aspects of corporate governance since 
their adoption can prove to be value-decreasing (Black et al. (2011)).     
15 Klapper and Love (2004) show that the variation in corporate governance ratings (using CLSA corporate 
governance scores) decreases as country level investor protection increases.   
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pay a dividend, but there is considerable variation in corporate dividend payouts here (the standard 
deviation of dividends to earnings (%) is 20.03). Dividend payouts tend to be low, and consistently so 
across firms in Korea, which is consistent with the cultural norm for Korean firms to hoard cash rather 
than pay dividends. The median and variation (around the mean payout) is low across all three payout 
measures (the median (standard deviation) of dividends to earnings, dividends to cashflow, and dividends 
to sales are 5.55 (8.92), 2.35 (4.70), and 0.30 (0.75), respectively).    
The remaining columns of Table 1 contain the shareholder (SR), creditor rights (CR), and legal 
enforcement data (ENF). Shareholders tend to enjoy considerable legal rights in Brazil (Revised ADR is 
5), Chile (5), Pakistan (5), South Africa (5), and Taiwan (5). In contrast, shareholder rights are much lower 
in China (1). Creditor rights (CR) are strong in Hong Kong (Creditor Rights is 4) and Hong Kong (4), but 
the weakest in Colombia (0), Mexico (0), and Peru (0). Interestingly, while on the face of it the legal rights 
afforded to shareholders and creditors appear strong in theory, in practice, many of these laws are poorly 
enforced. For example, the laws as written in statute, and their legal enforcement (ENF) tend to 
complement one another in some countries (e.g. creditor rights and their legal enforcement are strong in 
Singapore (CR is 4 and ENF is 4.23), South Africa (CR is 3 and ENF is 5.62), and Hong Kong (CR is 4 
and ENF is 5.35), while in others, poor creditor rights coincide with strong legal enforcement (e.g. Turkey 
(CR is 2 and ENF is 5.80), Hungary (CR is 1 and ENF is 5.90).16             
 
4. Results 
In this section I seek to examine whether the outcome model of dividends is most likely to hold 
given either strong creditor rights and/or strong enforcement of these creditor rights. First, I begin by 
establishing the prevalence of the outcome model of dividends in emerging markets, as has previously been 
done by Mitton (2004) using CLSA data. To do so, and like him, I estimate ordinary least squares 
regressions (OLS) of the following form: 
 
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 C
i i
DIV GOV Size Growth Profitability Cash SR
Industry  
(1) 
                                                 
16 The correlation between creditor rights and the enforcement of creditor rights is (0.463).  
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i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 c 7 c
8 c i i
DIV GOV Size Growth Profitability Cash SR CR
ENF Industry
 
(2) 
 
Where DIVi is either dividends-to-earnings (%), dividends-to-cashflow (%), or dividends-to-sales 
(%), and GOVi is the CLSA corporate governance score for each firm. Size, growth, profitability, and 
cash, are firm size, firm growth, firm profitability, and firm cash holdings, respectively. Industryi are 
industry dummies, and SRC, CRC, and ENFC are shareholder rights, creditor rights, and legal enforcement, 
respectively.17 Financial firms are excluded. All regressions are estimated with White (1980) standard 
errors. The coefficient estimates from estimating equations 1 and 2 are presented in Table 2. 
  The findings presented in Table 2 are in line with Mitton (2004), and others, and provide 
empirical support in favour of the outcome model of dividends. The coefficient estimates on the corporate 
governance variable are always positive and statistically different to zero. They range from a low of 0.048 
(t-stat is 2.04) (using dividends to sales (%)) to a high of 0.392 (t-stat is 3.32) using dividends to earnings 
(%). Using dividends to cashflow (%), the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable 
resulting from estimating equations 1 and 2 are 0.228 (t-stat is 2.23) and 0.186 (t-stat is 1.79), respectively. 
These coefficient estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase (improvement) in corporate 
governance standards (which is 14.3), which is close to the difference in the median corporate governance 
score for firms from China (48.17) and Chile (62.4) would imply an increase in dividend payout 
(dividends to earnings (%)) by 5.61 percentage points (i.e. 0.392 * 14.3), which incidentally is almost the 
difference in median dividends to earnings (%) payout between firms from China (28.8%) and Chile 
(34.8%) (I.e. 34.8% less 28.8% is 6%). Using dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%), the 
implied change in dividend arising from a one-standard deviation change in corporate governance is 3.26 
percentage points (i.e. 0.228 * 14.3), and 0.79 percentage points (i.e. 0.055 * 14.3), respectively. While not 
always statistically significant, the firm-level control variables are almost always of the correct sign. 
Consistent with the life-cycle model of dividends, large and profitable firms pay large dividends, while 
                                                 
17 Firms are designated into one of thirteen industries based on the following classifications using 4-digit SIC codes: 
Agriculture and Food (0100-0999 & 2000-2111); Mining and Construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399); 
Textiles and Printing/Publishing (2200-2799); Chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-2899); Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836); 
Extractive (2900-2999, 1300-1399); Durable Manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579); Transportation 
(4000-4899); Utilities (4900-4999); Retail (5000-5999); Services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379); Computers (7370-
7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679); Public Administration (9000+). 
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growth firms tend to pay small dividends (Grullon et al., 2002; De Angelo et al., 2006; Bulan et al., 2007; 
and Denis and Osobov, 2008). Cash rich firms pay large dividends.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
In columns 2, 4, and 6, I find evidence to suggest that corporate dividend payouts are influenced 
by the strength of creditor rights, but not shareholder rights nor legal enforcement. In line with 
Brockman and Unlu (2009), Shao et al. (2009), and Byrne and O’Connor (2012), the coefficient estimates 
on the creditor rights variable are positive and statistically different to zero. This suggests that dividend 
payouts are large when creditor are well protected, but much less so, when creditor rights are not so well 
protected. Contradicting earlier work from La Porta et al. (2000) and Mitton (2004), the shareholder 
rights variable is statistically insignificant, and surprisingly, the coefficient estimate is negative in four of 
the six regressions (albeit always statistically insignificant).18 Finally, the enforcement variable is incorrectly 
signed in all regressions, but always statistically insignificant.  
In the next section, I examine whether the ability of shareholders to extract dividends from firms 
using their legal rights (here defined at the firm-level) is contingent on the strength of creditor rights per 
se, and/or the enforcement of these same creditor rights. To do so, I estimate equation 1 separately for 
firms from countries with above and below-median creditor rights and legal enforcement, respectively. If 
both creditor rights and their enforcement matter, that is, to the ability of shareholders to extract 
dividends from firms (i.e. Hypotheses 1 and 2), then the coefficient estimate for the corporate governance 
variable should be positive, statistically significant, but more importantly, larger in countries where 
creditor rights (and legal enforcement) are strong. In turn, if legal enforcement is more important than 
creditor rights (i.e. Hypothesis 3), the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance variable should be 
greater in above-median enforcement jurisdictions than compared to countries with above-median 
creditor rights. As a precursor, consider Table 3.  
In Table 3, I outline the average and median dividend payout using all three dividend payout 
measures for well (High Governance) and poorly-governed (Low Governance) firms, and for both sets of 
firms by level of creditor rights (High and Low Creditor Rights) and legal enforcement (High and Low 
                                                 
18 Bartram et al. (2012) do find support for the equity-only version of the outcome model when they use Spamann’s 
(2010) anti-director rights measure.   
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Enforcement). A firm is deemed to have high (low) corporate governance if their governance score is 
above (below) the sample median (which is 54.93). Likewise, firms belong in high (low) creditor rights 
countries if the country-level creditor rights score is above (below) the sample median (which is 2). Since 
legal enforcement decreases in the number of days taken to resolve a dispute, firms belong in high (low) 
enforcement countries if the country-level enforcement is below (above) the sample median (which is 
5.90).      
The summary measures outlined in Table 3 suggest the following. First, and in line with the 
analysis presented in Table 2, dividends are an outcome of corporate governance. All else equal, better-
governed firms always pay larger dividends. For example, as a percentage of earnings, cashflow, and sales, 
the median well-governed (High Governance) firm pays out 4.80, 7.75, and 1.25 more of its’ earnings, 
cashflow, and sales in the form of a dividend when compared to less well-governed firms (Low 
Governance). Second, the outcome model is much more prevalent where creditor rights are strong, but not 
so legal enforcement. For example, the difference in average dividend payout between well-governed 
firms, but operating in different creditor rights regimes, as a percentage of earnings, cashflow, and sales is 
15.24, 13.03, and 2.78, respectively. Furthermore, all three differences are statistically significant. When I 
perform the same analysis using legal enforcement, the differences are much lower (i.e. 4.83, 0.65, and 
0.54) and never statistically different to zero. In summary, these findings support hypothesis 1, but not 
hypothesis 2. Finally, these findings suggest that if anything, it is creditor rights, and not how these rights 
are enforced which has greater relevance for the outcome model of dividends. Thus, these summary 
measures reject hypothesis 3.        
In the next section, I examine whether these same conclusions remain when I control for other 
determinates of corporate dividend payout.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
To do so, I estimate equation 1, but now by level of creditor rights and legal enforcement, 
respectively. A priori, if hypothesis 1 holds, then the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance 
variable should be statistically significant and larger where creditor rights are strong. If hypothesis 2 holds, 
then the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance variable should be statistically significant and 
 [15] 
 
larger where the enforcement of creditor rights is strong. Finally, to test hypothesis 3, I must compare the 
coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable across strong creditor rights and strong legal 
enforcement. If hypothesis 3 holds, then the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance variable 
should be statistically significant and larger where the enforcement of creditor rights is strong, compared 
to the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance variable where creditor rights are strong.    
The coefficient estimates are presented in Tables 4 and 5. For brevity sake, I only report the 
coefficient estimates for the corporate governance variable. The results using the enforcement of creditor 
rights are outlined in Table 5 and Table 5 the coefficient estimates for the regressions by the strength of 
creditor rights. What is most striking from Tables 4 and 5 is that the conclusions from the summary 
statistics outlined in Table 3 are reversed. In Table 4, and once I control for other determinants of 
corporate dividend payout, the outcome model prevails only where legal enforcement of creditor rights is 
strong. For example, when legal enforcement is strong, the coefficient estimates on the corporate 
governance variable range from a low of 0.088 (t-stat is 2.53) (Using dividends to sales (%)) to a high of 
0.447 (t-stat is 2.56) (Using dividends to cashflow (%)). In contrast, where legal enforcement is weak, the 
coefficient estimates are much lower (they range from 0.01 to 0.108), and are always statistically 
indifferent to zero (t-stats range from 0.15 to 0.52).  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
When I partition the full sample of firms by strength of creditor rights (Table 5), the coefficient 
estimates on the corporate governance variable are with one exception larger where creditor rights are 
strong (for example using dividends to earnings (%), the coefficient estimates on the corporate 
governance variable for high and low creditor rights are 0.231 and 0.158, respectively), but they are always 
statistically indifferent to zero (t-stats range from 0.39 to 1.04).  
 In summary, these findings suggest that creditors exert a profound influence on corporate 
dividend policy. All else equal, creditor demand, and firms consent to lower dividends, where creditor 
rights are poorly enforced. Consequently, these findings support hypotheses 2 and 3. Like Byrne and 
O’Connor (2012), I reject hypothesis 1, since differences in creditor rights are not systematically related to 
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dividend payout in the way predicted by the agency costs of debt and equity version of the outcome model 
of dividends.   
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper I test the agency costs of equity and debt version of the outcome model of dividends 
using a sample of 281 firms from 21 emerging market countries. Using firm-level measures of shareholder 
rights (i.e. corporate governance), the agency costs of equity and debt version of the outcome model of 
dividends, as outlined by Brockman and Unlu (2009), predicts that the outcome model is more effective 
under strong creditor rights. Where creditor rights are weak, shareholders can better use their legal rights 
to extract dividends from firms.   
I find no evidence to support this prediction. Like Byrne and O’Connor (2012), my results 
suggest that the outcome model fails to hold irrespective of the strength of creditor rights. However, I do 
find that the outcome model prevails under strong enforcement of creditor rights. Where the enforcement 
of their legal rights is weak, creditors demand, and firms consent to lower dividends. Hence, creditors, 
and not shareholders exert the greatest influence over corporate dividend policy. The extent of their 
influence is a function of the legal enforcement of their legal rights, and not their legal rights per se.   
These findings are in line with a large volume of recent literature which highlights the profound 
influence that creditors exert in corporations. For example, Nini et al. (2009) show that creditors restrict 
firm-level investment (capital expenditures) when borrower credit quality deteriorates, while Roberts and 
Sufi (2009) show that the ability to finance firm-level investment using debt financing is significantly 
reduced following debt covenant violations.     
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Table 1 
Sample Description 
  Corporate 
Governance 
Dividend Payout Measure Legal Variables 
  Corporate 
Governance 
Dividends to 
Earnings (%) 
Dividends to 
Cashflow (%) 
Dividends to 
Sales (%) 
Shareholder & Creditor 
Rights & Legal 
Enforcement 
Country # 
Firm 
MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD SR CR ENF 
Argentina 1 66.67 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 3 1 6.25 
Brazil 17 61.68 9.14 36.60 33.10 12.10 25.21 3.40 5.41 5 1 6.34 
Chile 7 62.40 4.18 34.80 16.49 11.70 10.50 1.30 1.69 5 2 5.72 
China 11 48.17 11.56 28.80 24.67 15.90 17.54 5.80 7.94 1 2 5.48 
Colombia 1 53.18 - 66.00 - 82.20 - 6.00 - 4 0 5.89 
Hong Kong 27 62.60 13.87 43.10 31.45 45.10 30.95 9.90 9.06 4 4 5.35 
Hungary 1 48.45 - 85.50 - 10.60 - 0.50 - 2 1 5.90 
India 48 52.49 11.04 24.05 21.99 16.55 20.34 3.40 2.31 4 2 6.05 
Indonesia 12 36.33 13.59 23.65 25.96 20.30 26.64 1.95 4.78 4 2 6.35 
Korea 14 39.73 5.73 5.55 8.92 2.35 4.70 0.30 0.75 4 3 4.32 
Malaysia 24 60.00 12.49 36.70 31.40 29.50 27.28 4.45 4.93 4 3 5.70 
Mexico 4 66.99 3.97 28.05 14.94 15.40 8.04 3.95 2.83 2 0 6.04 
Pakistan 7 26.83 16.71 64.90 30.32 67.30 30.68 6.60 7.45 5 1 5.98 
Peru 1 76.48 - 18.90 - 33.00 - 8.00 - 4 0 6.09 
Philippines 12 40.58 12.22 5.30 19.61 0.40 18.61 0.15 1.61 4 1 5.94 
Poland 1 37.73 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 2 1 6.91 
Singapore 26 66.45 7.99 43.80 29.66 24.80 29.47 2.55 6.05 4 3 4.23 
Sth Africa 16 64.27 16.09 27.50 33.01 22.60 23.25 2.85 7.21 5 3 5.62 
Taiwan 31 54.93 9.08 17.40 25.42 9.30 20.19 1.10 3.51 5 2 5.35 
Thailand 13 51.07 14.21 47.40 37.38 27.90 30.64 6.30 7.14 4 2 5.97 
Turkey 7 46.58 10.56 0.00 20.03 0.00 6.69 0.00 0.60 4 2 5.80 
 Total MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD Median 
 281 54.93 14.30 27.90 28.99 17.00 25.88 2.50 5.83 4 2 5.90 
Notes: This table describes the sample by country. # Firms is the number of firms. For each country, I report the median 
(MD) and standard deviation (SD) of corporate governance, dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and 
dividends to sales (%), respectively. In the remaining columns, I report shareholder rights (SR) data from Spamann (2009) and 
Djankov et al. (2008) (for China, Hungary, and Poland), and creditor rights (CR) and legal enforcement (ENF) data are from 
Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope.  Corporate governance measures are 
from CLSA (2001).          
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Table 2 
Regression Estimates 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.228** 
(2.23) 
0.186* 
(1.79) 
0.392*** 
(3.32) 
0.389*** 
(3.36) 
0.055** 
(2.37) 
0.048** 
(2.04) 
       
Size 
 
-0.401 
(0.39) 
-0.557 
(0.49) 
0.233 
(0.19) 
0.468 
(0.36) 
0.212 
(1.04) 
0.215 
(0.98) 
Growth 
 
-1.386 
(0.15) 
-1.424 
(0.16) 
-25.890** 
(2.45) 
-26.769** 
(2.52) 
-3.087 
(1.42) 
-3.199 
(1.48) 
Profitability 
 
24.310* 
(1.80) 
25.663* 
(1.74) 
21.500 
(1.33) 
18.940 
(1.10) 
12.658*** 
(4.13) 
12.571*** 
(3.92) 
Cash 
 
27.629** 
(2.26) 
22.672* 
(1.75) 
21.643 
(1.50) 
21.598 
(1.42) 
8.109** 
(2.47) 
7.297** 
(2.15) 
Shareholder Rights 
 
0.781 
(0.48) 
0.565 
(0.35) 
-0.441 
(0.21) 
-0.728 
(0.34) 
-0.561 
(1.20) 
-0.631 
(1.35) 
Creditor Rights 
 
 4.001* 
(1.80) 
 2.504 
(1.02) 
 0.952* 
(1.94) 
Enforcement 
 
 0.728 
(0.24) 
 3.290 
(1.04) 
 0.513 
(0.94) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 281 281 281 281 281 281 
R-Squared 0.285 0.298 0.217 0.222 0.353 0.366 
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented 
underneath in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is dividends to cashflow (%), 
dividends to earnings (%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. Size is the log of book assets in US$, growth is logarithmic 
one-year asset growth, profitability is earnings before interest and taxation to book assets, and cash is cash to assets. In columns 
(1), (3), and (5) a full set of country and industry dummies are included, but not reported. The country dummies are excluded 
from columns (2), (4), and (6). Shareholder rights data is from Spamann (2009) and Djankov et al. (2008) (for China, Hungary, 
and Poland), and creditor rights (CR) and legal enforcement (ENF) data are from Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). All 
firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). # Firms is the number of 
firms, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Univariate Statistics 
 Average Dividend Payout (%) 
 Corporate Governance 
 High Governance Low Governance Difference 
(High – Low) 
Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) 27.74 22.36 5.38* 
Dividends-to-Earnings (%) 36.91 29.55 7.36** 
Dividends-to-Sales (%) 5.44 3.87 1.57** 
 High Corporate Governance  
& Creditor Rights 
 High Creditor Rights Low Creditor Rights Difference 
(High – Low) 
Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) 35.42 20.18 15.24*** 
Dividends-to-Earnings (%) 43.47 30.44 13.03*** 
Dividends-to-Sales (%) 6.84 4.06 2.78*** 
 High Corporate Governance  
& Enforcement 
 High Enforcement Low Enforcement Difference 
(High – Low) 
Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) 29.29 24.46 4.83 
Dividends-to-Earnings (%) 37.12 36.47 0.65 
Dividends-to-Sales (%) 5.61 5.07 0.54 
 Median Dividend Payout (%) 
 Corporate Governance 
 High Governance Low Governance Difference 
(High – Low) 
Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) 19.40 14.60 4.80** 
Dividends-to-Earnings (%) 31.10 23.35 7.75** 
Dividends-to-Sales (%) 3.00 1.75 1.25*** 
 High Corporate Governance  
& Creditor Rights 
 High Creditor Rights Low Creditor Rights Difference 
(High – Low) 
Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) 31.15 13.70 17.45*** 
Dividends-to-Earnings (%) 39.65 25.10 14.55** 
Dividends-to-Sales (%) 3.90 2.80 1.10* 
 High Corporate Governance  
& Enforcement 
 High Enforcement Low Enforcement Difference 
(High – Low) 
Dividends-to-Cashflow (%) 21.80 15.20 6.60 
Dividends-to-Earnings (%) 34.95 28.60 6.35 
Dividends-to-Sales (%) 2.70 3.50 (0.80) 
Notes: This table present average and median dividend payouts by strength of corporate governance. Median dividend payout 
is presented for firms with high and low corporate governance and for high corporate governance firms in countries with high 
and low creditor rights and legal enforcement, respectively. Dividend payout is measured using either dividends to cashflow 
(%), dividends to earnings (%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001), 
and dividend payout measures are sourced from Worldscope. Creditor rights (CR) and legal enforcement (ENF) data are from 
Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Regression Estimates by Strength of Legal Enforcement 
 Enforcement of Creditor Rights 
 Strong Enforcement 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.284** 
(2.02) 
0.447** 
(2.56) 
0.088** 
(2.53) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Firm Controls Included Included Included 
# Firms 164 164 164 
R-Squared 0.363 0.302 0.398 
 Weak Enforcement 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.093 
(0.57) 
0.108 
(0.52) 
0.010 
(0.15) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Firm Controls Included Included Included 
# Firms 117 117 117 
R-Squared 0.381 0.281 0.400 
 Hypothesis 2 
Difference in Corporate Governance Coefficient Estimates 
(High less Low Enforcement of Creditor Rights) 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
Hypothesis 2 0.191 0.339 0.078 
    
 Hypothesis 3 
Difference in Corporate Governance Coefficient Estimates 
(High Enforcement of Creditor Rights less High Creditor Rights) 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
Hypothesis 3 0.207 0.216 0.036 
    
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented 
underneath in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. Separate regressions are estimated for firms from countries 
with above and below-median legal enforcement. The dependent variable is dividends to cashflow (%), dividends to earnings 
(%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. Size is the log of book assets in US$, growth is logarithmic one-year asset growth, 
profitability is earnings before interest and taxation to book assets, and cash is cash to assets. Legal enforcement (ENF) data is 
from Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). The bottom panel reports the difference in coefficient estimates for the corporate 
governance variable by strength of the enforcement of creditor rights (Hypothesis 2) and the difference in coefficient estimates 
for the corporate governance variable by strength of the enforcement of creditor rights and creditor rights (Hypothesis 3). All 
firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). # Firms is the number of 
firms, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Regression Estimates by Strength of Creditor Rights 
 Creditor Rights 
 High Creditor Rights 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.077 
(0.39) 
0.231 
(0.92) 
0.052 
(0.95) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Firm Controls Included Included Included 
# Firms 93 93 93 
R-Squared 0.346 0.335 0.489 
 Low Creditor Rights 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.117 
(0.89) 
0.158 
(1.04) 
0.023 
(0.89) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Firm Controls Included Included Included 
# Firms 188 188 188 
R-Squared 0.282 0.203 0.255 
 Hypothesis 1 
Difference in Corporate Governance Coefficient Estimates 
(High less Low Creditor Rights) 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
Hypothesis 1 (0.04) 0.073 0.029 
    
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented 
underneath in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. Separate regressions are estimated for firms from countries 
with above and below-median creditor rights. The dependent variable is dividends to cashflow (%), dividends to earnings (%), 
and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. Size is the log of book assets in US$, growth is logarithmic one-year asset growth, 
profitability is earnings before interest and taxation to book assets, and cash is cash to assets. Creditor rights (CR) is from 
Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). The bottom panel reports the difference in coefficient estimates for the corporate 
governance variable by strength of creditor rights (Hypothesis 1). All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate 
governance measures are from CLSA (2001). # Firms is the number of firms, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
